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In this paper, German sociologist Niklas Luhmann’s theories on social systems will be discussed in connection with Foucault’s epistemological definitions and discourse theory to form a more concise interpretation of how social theory has developed within museums. 
By comparing and contrasting Foucault’s and Luhmann’s concepts of social structures, it is 
possible to identify understandings of social movements in museological developments and at 
the same time approach forthcoming developments in visitor and participatory practices.
Looking at epistemological developments within museum history has often involved 
examining sociological and philosophical structures as well. Specifically, the development of 
historical understandings of the establishment of thought and meaning seem to concentrate on 
social definitions of development. This approach seems natural from a museological perspective, 
especially as the French philosopher Michel Foucault’s epistemological definitions of the 
Renaissance, Classical and Modern “episteme” have been applied to the historical development 
of museums.1 In his definitions, Foucault identified a set of different epistemes or historical 
periods with their own discourse for knowledge development. Foucault’s epistemological 
definitions are not directly linked to museology. Rather, they are viewed as acknowledged 
spaces of a given time, but they can also be useful when identifying museological epistemology. 
Foucault proposed that the way people regarded and managed, for example, the first museum 
collections, very much depended on how they regarded the world, society and community 
around them. He was especially interested in principles that were viewed as accepted or allowed 
or could be thought at a specific time. Foucault believed it to be of great importance to 
understand these principles in order to identify and understand the social development of, for 
example, a museum and indeed how and why collections were managed the way they were. 
By an “episteme,” Foucault meant those techniques, codes, languages, and values that shaped 
a culture. These principles of knowledge define what was regarded as “acceptable thought” or 
“the truth” at a specific moment in history.2
Foucault is a much-used source when identifying and analysing epistemological 
perspectives, yet he has also been criticised for promoting a somewhat negative view of 
museums as Enlightenment institutions that strive to organise and classify learning and social 
interaction according to universal rules. This criticism is specifically connected to his description 
of the museum as a heterotopia.3 For Foucault, the term heterotopia describes spaces that have 
more layers of meaning or relationships. A heterotopia may be a physical representation of a 
utopia, such as the world represented in a museum, or a type of parallel space that contains 
undesirable elements to make a real utopian space possible, such as a prison. The concept of 
heterotopias that Foucault defined directly in terms of museums posits them as negative and 
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confusing places, where cultural development is neglected or completely abandoned due to 
their general tendency to classify and order objects and collections in outdated paradigms. 
However, as Beth Lord discusses, Foucault’s description of the museum as a heterotopia can also 
promote museums as positive and progressive places, where layers of meaning can engender 
different understandings and ways of creating relevance.4 It should be noted that this is the only 
direct link we have between Foucault’s epistemological definitions and museums. Nevertheless, 
historical and epistemological developments within museums are often treated as connected 
with Foucault’s definitions of epistemes alone, particularly in modern and postmodern aspects 
of thought. Therefore, it may be useful to examine how social theories of understanding and 
interpreting meaning have developed as part of museology.5 
When studying developments of modernism and postmodernism within museum 
history, we must also look at the social movements and tendencies of past societies 
and communities. The way objects were collected, how exhibitions evolved, and how 
knowledge was created from collections were very much influenced by the way society 
(and indeed the world) was viewed and understood. Naturally, this necessitates examining 
ideological aspects of thought; in his article Different Spaces Foucault actually encourages 
the concept of a society with many heterotopias, not just to encourage difference, but also 
to promote spaces for new social developments.6 Foucault understood progress as a growth 
of social capabilities and possibilities, not necessarily as historical or cultural advancement 
alone, nor as the movement towards a specific goal or ideal. Social and individual progress 
defines which power relations and historical events are regarded as matters of course and 
therefore as necessities at a given time.7 They are essentially the rules or laws that are not 
questioned because they are considered “truth.” It is within this type of progress that the 
historical developments of museums can be identified, future challenges and possibilities 
can be pinpointed, and where museums can find an individual path to contribute to further 
social and cultural developments. 
Structures of Social Systems
It is possible to further define Foucault’s approaches to museum development and change by 
looking at other theories of social systems. In his discussion of sociological systems theory, 
Luhmann argues that everything can, in fact, be described in terms of systems.8 In this 
definition, society does not consist of people but of a series of communicative sub-systems, 
each performing a special function. Each system of function has a code of meaning, which 
holds its origin in a basic value, i.e. a common belief. This belief often structures how a 
system functions culturally, socially and personally, and can deal with e.g. shared social 
behaviours or norms, individual developments and wishes, and communication methods 
such as terminologies used within an organisation, articulations of tasks and responsibilities, 
and social approaches to individual needs. Luhmann believed that systems communicated 
with society through these codes of meaning. According to Luhmann, we only have access 
to the physical world through observation. The moment we begin to observe something, 
a different belief system is in operation between what we observe and what we do not 
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observe. In other words, it is not possible to observe something without filtering out 
something else.  According to Luhmann, a system will only understand and use its own 
code of meaning, and will not understand nor use the code of another system. It is not 
possible to import the code of one system into another because systems are closed and can 
only react to things within their environment. Simple examples of these meaning codes 
include the code of the political system, which can be identified as power/non-power, the 
health system’s code as ill/non-ill, and a military system as peace/non-peace. A meaning 
code will never have an equal balance between its two definitions; all systems will naturally 
always strive for the positive aspect of the meaning code. This also means that all meaning 
codes are essentially subjective because what is regarded as, for example, power or non-
power is subject to an individual’s subjective thinking.9 
The difference between the system and its surroundings is what creates identity. Luhmann 
also believed that systems were characterised by being closed, self-referencing and self-
creating; thus, a system will approach its choices and decisions from its own understanding.10 
Consequently, a system can only open up to its surroundings when, through its internal logic, it 
comes across a disturbance. Disturbances arise when the system is able to reflect upon its own 
differences in comparison to its surroundings.11 For museums, such disturbances might come 
in the shape of specific community engagements, increased visitor influences, fresh research 
initiatives within their collections, or new communication strategies. The surroundings will 
always be more complex than the system itself, and the more complex the surrounding world, 
the greater the opportunity for the system to increase the complexity of its own identity. By 
observing the surrounding world, the system can grasp an opportunity to increase and develop 
its own complexity. The difference between a system and the surrounding world is created 
by communication, and is therefore determined by what the receiver hears and understands. 
This makes communication essential to all types of learning within the system. The crux of 
learning thus pivots on how meaning is created in different relations: internally, within an 
organisation, and externally, between organisations and the surrounding world. Through this 
definition, Luhmann is offering an almost complete theory: it is not possible to transfer values 
and knowledge from one human being to another, but it is possible to “free” a system, let it take 
responsibility and create itself.12
This discussion shows that if we view the museum as a closed self-referencing and self-
creating system that can only open up to its surroundings by creating a disturbance, then the 
social development of museum history and epistemology can also be seen as part of a postmodern 
movement. Within the social constructionist strand of postmodernism, the concepts of social 
dialogue and the constant exchange of views and opinions become essential. The museum 
can choose to remain a closed system; however, only when disturbances in the shape of new 
ideas, inputs, social and cultural changes and constant dialogue with the surrounding world 
take place will it then be possible to increase the complexity of the museum as a place of social 
and cultural communication and interaction. The museum, as a social system, must be able to 
reflect upon its own differences and relevance. These aspects become clearer when examining 
Luhmann’s and Foucault’s theories together.
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Creating new structures
To further this approach, I believe it is fruitful to connect Luhmann’s theories on systems to 
Foucault’s analysis of discourses. Although Luhmann (1927-1998) and Foucault (1926-1984) 
were contemporaries, and their work generally revolved around many of the same theoretical 
principles, only occasionally do they refer directly to each other’s work. Indeed, it is mainly 
during the last few decades that more all-encompassing comparisons are drawn in literature 
between the two theorists.13 Drawing a closer comparison between Luhmann’s definition of 
systems and Foucault’s analysis of discourses allows us to outline a different understanding of the 
museum as a communicative system.
 According to Foucault, “the term discourse can be defined as the group of statements 
that belong to a single system of formation.”14 This means that each system in its individual 
formation identifies and refers to its own beliefs and statements with the sole purpose of 
defining itself. Discourses therefore become a series of statements limited by a system, but 
only belonging to a single system of formation. The statements discussed within the system, 
without external influence, will determine the subject. Foucault directs his analysis on 
discourses towards “the statement” – he defines and analyses these theories in his work The 
Archaeology of Knowledge (1969).15 He argues that the core of the discourse is the statement. 
A discourse analysis therefore requires a closer look at which relations exist between 
the statements, including their transformation, place and how widely they are spread. A 
discursive formation is established by defining different types of statements - a sort of policy 
on how we act within the system. Foucault thereby proposes that “the statement” becomes 
rules that render an expression, a proposition or an act as discursively meaningful.16 Once 
it is transformed into rules, “the statement�” is endowed with a very special meaning in 
Foucault’s definition: it is the rules that make an expression or a proposition discursively 
meaningful, not the statement in itself. 
This creates a direct link to Luhmann’s definition of the system as closed and self-
referencing, and it is possible to see certain shared discursive elements between Luhmann’s 
and Foucault’s theories.17 Discourses are meaning structures that make it possible to determine 
different meaning elements, such as our shared social and cultural values and our social aspects 
of thoughts. Discourses are also the result of interventions (direct or indirect) that either connect 
meaning elements to each other or disconnect them. More importantly, both Luhmann and 
Foucault argue that an analysis can in itself provoke a suitable disturbance to a social system. This 
means that a disturbance such as new technological, social, interpretative or cultural impacts 
may create entirely new sets of values and beliefs that not only challenge the old discourse, 
but that also may transform it to encompass new meaning structures. This is often the case 
at museums where major projects, immense refurbishments, or new approaches have formed 
new interpretive experiences, reached new audiences, or broadened collection research and 
communication. Furthermore, from a historical context, it is possible to observe and analyse a 
closed system through potential oppositional systems because they provide a suitable balance 
for analytical observations.18
These definitions become especially relevant in terms of museum communication and 
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interaction because they state that a museum as a social system can itself create a proper 
disturbance and therefore question, criticise, and redefine its own relevance within society. 
A disturbance within such a strong communicative and interpretative system as a museum 
will undoubtedly set new standards for communication between the museum and other 
systems, or groups of communities and society. First and foremost, this involves communication 
and interaction with many different groups of museum visitors. Some museums have been 
very successful in interacting with different visitor and community groups, engaging in new 
partnerships and forming new communication facilities around their existing social structures. 
However, museums are also known to be reluctant towards any form of change and often regard 
change as a problem. In order for museums to form new theoretical and practical structures 
of social and interactive development, they must be open to new ways of looking at their 
essential disciplines: learning, interpretation, research, interaction, and communication. Change 
or transformation may also require an examination of academic and non-academic disciplines, 
such as futurology or storytelling, which as yet have not been fully connected to museology. 
Above all, forming new social structures for future museological development requires museums 
to open up to both theoretical and practical disturbances that can help them develop their 
epistemological and social understandings in a fast changing world. In other words, it is within 
challenges (or disturbances) that social systems such as museums can develop new meaning 
structures for themselves and their visitors, and at the same time (re-)define themselves as 
strong, relevant and meaningful institutions in the society in which they exist. Graham Black 
provides a fitting statement on which to conclude: “Society is changing much faster than we 
are. We must accept the need for rapid change in museum ethos and practice, even in times of 
financial hardship, in order to respond to twenty-first century demands – a big challenge for a 
profession that is notoriously resistant to change. For the necessary change to happen, we must 
all be futurists now.”19
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